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11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
12	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
13	SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION			
14	IDUTED CTATES OF AMERICA	CACENO CVO	00 7011 DG	
15	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,)	CASE NO. CV 2		
16	Plaintiff,)	DECLARATION OF JEREMIAH HAYNIE IN SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES' MOTION TO		
17	v.)		VERIFIED CLAIM OF JJA MATUSKO	
18	Approximately 69,370 Bitcoin (BTC), Bitcoin) Gold (BTG), Bitcoin SV (BSV), and Bitcoin)	Hearing Date:	September 30, 2021	
19	Cash (BCH) seized from 1HQ3Go3ggs8pFnXuHVHRytPCq5fGG8Hbhx 2	Time: Court:	1:30 p.m. Hon. Richard Seeborg	
20	Defendant.	Court.	Holl. Richard Sectiong	
21)			
22	ILIJA MATUSKO,)			
23	Claimant.			
24	,			
25	I, JEREMIAH HAYNIE, state as follows:			
26	1. I am a Special Agent with the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue			
27	Service ("IRS-CI"). I am a case agent assigned to this case. I respectfully submit this declaration to			
28				
	DECLARATION OF IEREMIAH HAVNIE 1			

provide certain relevant information in support of the United States' Motion to Strike the Verified Claim of Ilija Matusko. I personally conducted the blockchain analysis of the bitcoin at issue in this case and was involved in the investigation from its inception to the present day.

A. Silk Road User Registration

- 2. Ross Ulbricht went to great lengths to ensure that buyers and sellers on Silk Road were able to operate anonymously. The subtitle of Silk Road was "anonymous market." *See* Exhibit 1 attached hereto. Consistent with the operation of an anonymous market, Silk Road users were required to provide very little identifying information. Users that registered with Silk Road were required to provide a username and a password. Users could optionally provide a country of residence, write a description, and upload an image. Of note, the user was not required and was not asked to provide identifying information such as a real name, physical address, ¹ social security number, date of birth, email address, or phone number. In addition, a user was not required to deposit bitcoin or pay a fee to register an account on Silk Road. I know this because various law enforcement agents opened accounts with Silk Road as part of different investigations and did not have to deposit bitcoin or pay a fee.
- 3. The registration process for Silk Road differs greatly from the processes required from cryptocurrency exchanges such as Coinbase, Kraken, Binance, and others. Unlike Silk Road, reputable exchangers and cryptocurrency companies require users of their respective platforms to conform with relevant laws and regulations, including those set forth by the Bank Secrecy Act and related regulations, such as "Know Your Customer" (or "KYC") requirements. Prospective customers of those exchanges are thus required to confirm their identities prior to trading or purchasing cryptocurrencies on those exchanges, and anything used to obtain confirmation of that identity is obtainable by law enforcement. Conversely, Silk Road went to great lengths to maintain privacy and anonymity of its users, and so required no proof of identity. Indeed, doing so would have completely undermined the purpose of Silk Road.

¹ In some instances, buyers provided vendors with a physical mailing address in order to receive drug shipments. Due to the fact that users were receiving drugs, individuals in online forums often advised buyers to use addresses not associated with the buyer in case the packages were interdicted.

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4. On approximately October 2, 2013, as part of their investigation into Silk Road and Ross Ulbricht, the FBI seized a server that contained information about Silk Road users. Within this data was a table² labeled "users" that contained registration information about Silk Road users. Exhibit 2, attached and shown below, is an export of the information that the table labeled "users" contained for hanson5.³

modified	1325034975 [Converts from Unix Time to December 28, 2011 01:16:15 UTC]
created	1325034975 [Converts from Unix Time to December 28, 2011 01:16:15 UTC]
last_user_agent	<u> </u>
bond refund	0
alias	hanson5
discussion ban	0
seller ban	0
seller start	0
read announcement	1
last bitcoin request	1344382552 [Converts from Unix Time to August 7, 2012 23:35:52 UTC]
last action	1352091317 [Converts from Unix Time to November 5, 2012 04:55:17 UTC]
auto withdraw address 3	
auto withdraw address 2	
auto withdraw address 1	
auto_withdraw	0
stealth mode	0
commission_pricing	0
incognito	0
currency_id	37
display_price	0
hedge	0
peg	36
active	0
role	0
rating_sort	weight
sort_by	
domestic_only	1
ship_to	
ship_from	
location	Germany
description	This user has yet to enter a description
transactions	0
vendor_weight	0
buyer_weight	0
rating	0
rank	0
total_weight	0
average_rating	0
credit_limit	0
tx_lock	0
available	47.52
usalt	[Redacted]
bc_addr	
pin_attempts	0
pin	
pass	[Redacted]
user	hanson5
id	cfaf83c718
index	123591

² SQL databases are made up of tables that store data in rows and columns, similar to spreadsheets.

³ The "pass" value appeared to be a hashed password, meaning that it was not stored in clear text. The "usalt" value suggested that the password was salted, meaning extra characters were added to it before it was hashed. I redacted the password and salt values to protect the claimant from password reuse attacks. I also converted the Unix time to a readable date/time format where noted.

B. Flow of Bitcoin Through Silk Road

- 5. Once a user deposited bitcoin to their assigned bitcoin address on Silk Road, their Silk Road account was credited with the requisite bitcoin, which Silk Road then used as it saw fit. For example, if User A deposited one bitcoin to the bitcoin address Silk Road assigned him, User A's account was credited with one bitcoin. The actual bitcoin contained within the Bitcoin address assigned to the user could then be used by Silk Road as needed. If, in the same example, User B requested a withdrawal of one bitcoin, Silk Road could have sent User B the one bitcoin it just received from User A. Even though the one bitcoin came from a Bitcoin address assigned to User A, User A's balance would not change.
- 6. This method of internal accounting is common outside the bitcoin world as well. For example, if a bank customer hands a \$100 bill to a bank teller with instructions to deposit it to her account, the customer's account is credited with \$100 and the actual \$100 bill is put into the teller's till. The bank can do whatever it wants with the \$100 bill and it will not affect the customer's account. For example, if a bank robber is next in line and demands the money from the teller, and the teller gives the bank robber the \$100 bill, the customer's account is not reduced by \$100.
- 7. When Individual X stole 70,411.46 bitcoin from Silk Road, the balance of the hanson5 account was not affected; it remained at 47.52 bitcoin. The bitcoin that Individual X stole originated from bitcoin addresses that were assigned to Silk Road users as deposit addresses, but just like the scenario in which \$100 was stolen from the bank, the Silk Road user accounts had already received their credit, so the bitcoin stolen by Individual X was part of the Silk Road pool. Ulbricht did not deduct the user account balances by the amount that was stolen because the funds were not taken from specific user accounts. I am unaware of any public announcement of this theft by Ulbricht. This was also not a fatal event to the operation of Silk Road since Silk Road continued to operate for another 17 months before Ulbricht was arrested.
- 8. In summary, once a Silk Road user deposits bitcoin to their assigned address, their account is credited and the actual bitcoin that was deposited becomes part of the Silk Road pool.

C. Withdrawing Bitcoin from a Silk Road User Account

9. Matusko asserts that "[a]t no time did the Marketplace provide, nor did Mr. Matusko

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know, the private key to access the Marketplace wallet or thereafter control the 48 bitcoin." The hanson5 accountholder did not require the Silk Road private key to withdraw bitcoin. Silk Road users could withdraw bitcoin from their account by simply accessing their account, entering the amount they wanted to withdraw, and the bitcoin address to send it to. All hanson5 had to do was log into the account and request a withdrawal.

10. Matusko wrote that, "Sometime later I realized that I had forgotten my password to my 'hanson5' user account and that I no longer had access to my account." Due to the anonymity Silk Road provided to its users, Silk Road did not have an official password recovery option for its users. However, a Google search of "Silk Road password reset" led to the following internet post dated June 7, 2013:

"If you forgot your password, unfortunately you will not be able to retrieve it. Some people have had success by creating a new account and messaging mods either on the forum or via the Road. If you can prove that you are the owner of the other account (By stating order history, bitcoin balance, pin code, etc.) then you **might** have some luck getting the account back." ⁴

D. <u>United States v. Twenty-Four Cryptocurrency Accounts (Welcome to Video)</u>

- 11. Matusko asserts that, "in similar bitcoin forfeiture actions, the government traced all transactions on the bitcoin blockchain and provided direct notice via certified mail and email to all potential users." He cites to *United States v. Twenty-Four Cryptocurrency Accounts*, 473 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2020). The investigation that gave rise to *United States v. Twenty-Four Cryptocurrency Accounts* was an investigation of "Welcome To Video," a Tor-based website engaged in the sale of child sexual abuse material. I am familiar with this investigation and provided a small amount of assistance to the Special Agent charged with investigating the case.⁵
- 12. A major goal of the Welcome To Video investigation was to identify the purchasers of child sexual abuse material. The team recognized that a portion of bitcoin that was used to purchase child sexual abuse material originated from three specific exchanges known to require KYC information from their customers. The team used the identifying information collected by the exchanges as a

⁴ https://www.reddit.com/r/SilkRoad/comments/1fve2n/password_reset/

⁵ In October 2017, I, along with others in my group, were asked to conduct open-source searches to identify social media profiles of individuals who had purchased child sexual abuse material from Welcome To Video.

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additional investigative actions such as open-source searches, bitcoin tracing, interviews, surveillance, and physical search warrants to gather evidence about each accountholder. Numerous purchasers of child pornography on the site were prosecuted as a result of the investigation. On October 16, 2019, the United States filed a verified complaint for forfeiture in rem to seize the funds that remained in the exchange accounts held by the Welcome To Video customers.

- 13. In contrast, the investigation of the stolen Silk Road bitcoin did not require the identification of Silk Road users to determine the identity of the person responsible for stealing bitcoin from Silk Road. Moreover, Silk Road itself did not require its users to provide any KYC information, rendering information on Silk Road users unobtainable. Indeed, bitcoin sent to Silk Road did not need to flow through a hosted exchange; the bitcoin used to fuel accounts at Silk Road could have stemmed from either exchanges or unhosted wallets, which are far more difficult to trace than hosted wallets.
- 14. Finally, the technology to trace the deposits of cryptocurrency utilized in the Welcome to Video case was not widely available at the time of the Southern District of New York's seizure in 2013. Most commercial cryptocurrency tracing services in existence today did not exist, or were not fully established, at the time of the initial seizure.
- 15. Elliptic was founded in October 2013 (see www.elliptic.co/our-story). Chainalysis was founded in 2014 (see https://web.archive.org/web/20170601100217/https://www.chainalysis.com/). CipherTrace was founded in 2015 (see https://ciphertrace.com/about-us/).

E. **Price of Bitcoin**

16. The U.S. government seized the Silk Road servers and arrested Ross Ulbricht on or about October 2, 2013. The closing price of bitcoin on that date was approximately \$140.30.6 Accordingly. on October 2, 2013, the 47.52 bitcoin contained in the hanson5 account was valued at approximately \$6,667.06.

Illegal Drugs Made Up More than 95 Percent of the Listings on Silk Road F.

17. According to exhibits (940 and 940A) presented during the Ulbricht trial, more than 95

⁶ https://www.investing.com/crypto/bitcoin/historical-data DECLARATION OF JEREMIAH HAYNIE

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percent of all listings on the Silk Road Marketplace were illegal narcotics. The "Other" category included some illegal items, such as fake passports, and some legal items such as books. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. Executed this 9th day of September, 2021 in East Lansing, Michigan. /s/ Jeremiah Haynie JEREMIAH HAYNIE Special Agent Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation

Exhibit 1

SA-9



Hi, cirrus

logout

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messages 0 orders 0 account \$0.0000 \$0.00

Search

anonymous market Silk Road

From the forum

- Buyer ratings discussion Feedback system changes
- HOW TO: Run your own relay and help the Tor network!
 - Ask a drug expert physician about drugs Winning the war on and health
- New display currencies Try Tails for a more
 - secure OS

Favorite vendors

remove

Dread Pirate Roberts 5.0

Libertas 1.0 remove inigo 0.0 remove



Seratam 1200 mg

Dissociatives 199

Intoxicants 75

Opioids 367

Other 82

Ecstasy 1,274

Cannabis 2,934

Drugs 13,810

Shop by Category

25X LSD BLOTTER

\$421.19

100x1200mg (nootropil

\$92.64

PIRACETAM tbl.

Boldabol 200 (B. Dragon),

10ml, 200mg.ml \$66.11

Psychedelics 1,754

Stimulants 1,634

Tobacco 219

Apparel 767

Prescription 4,659

Precursors 62







\$547.65

grams of PURE MDMA

Computer equipment 101

Collectibles 27

Books 1,322

Custom Orders 86

Digital goods 886

Moonrocks. \$378.58

Drug paraphernalia 512

Electronics 234



300mg/ml 10ml USA ONLY \$114.21 SCIROXX - Nandrodex

HYDRO BUDS 2G

10.0g MDA - Reagent

\$40.00

\$550.00

Lotteries & games 165

Lab Supplies 29

Jewelry 104

Home & Garden 27

Forgeries 152

Hardware 35

Fireworks 35

Food 10

Erotica 584

Musical instruments 6

Money 258 Medical 60

Packaging 95

Services 168

Sporting goods 4

Writing 8 Tickets 4

Tested

1/4 Bubba Kush

GOVERNMENT

EXHIBIT 132











10g Amnesia Haze





4 Orange sunshine 300ug








\$90.49

\$194.77



14 Cr. 68 (KBF)

Exhibit 2

	_
index	123591
id	cfaf83c718
user	hanson5
pass	[Redacted]
pin	
pin_attempts	0
bc_addr	
usalt	[Redacted]
available	47.52
tx_lock	0
credit_limit	0
average_rating	0
total_weight	0
rank	0
rating	0
buyer_weight	0
vendor_weight	0
transactions	0
description	This user has yet to enter a description
location	Germany
ship_from	'
ship to	
domestic only	1
sort_by	
rating sort	weight
role	0
active	0
peg	36
hedge	0
display price	0
currency_id	37
incognito	0
commission_pricing	0
stealth mode	0
auto withdraw	0
auto withdraw address 1	
auto withdraw address 2	
auto withdraw address 3	
last action	1352091317 [Converts from Unix Time to November 5, 2012 04:55:17 UTC]
last bitcoin request	1344382552 [Converts from Unix Time to August 7, 2012 23:35:52 UTC]
read announcement	1
seller start	0
_	0
seller_ban discussion ban	0
alias	hanson5
bond_refund	0
last_user_agent	1235024075 [Converts from Univ.Time to December 20, 2014 01.45.45 UTC]
created	1325034975 [Converts from Unix Time to December 28, 2011 01:16:15 UTC]
modified	1325034975 [Converts from Unix Time to December 28, 2011 01:16:15 UTC]